在最近的播客中，美利堅(jiān)大學(xué)法學(xué)教授希拉里·艾倫 (Hilary Allen) 將穩(wěn)定幣描繪成對銀行系統(tǒng)乃至廣大公眾的危險(xiǎn)威脅。在她看來，穩(wěn)定幣可能會破壞銀行的穩(wěn)定，并最終需要政府救助。

她發(fā)表此番言論之際，美國國會正在推動聯(lián)邦層面監(jiān)管穩(wěn)定幣。盡管任何穩(wěn)定幣法案在總統(tǒng)選舉之年成為法律的可能性都很渺茫，但艾倫擔(dān)心這些法案“給予了公眾對穩(wěn)定幣的支持”。對她來說，“穩(wěn)定幣沒有任何重要用途，坦率地說，應(yīng)該被禁止?！?/p>

Marcelo M. Prates 是 Consensus 2024 的演講者，是一位金融政策和監(jiān)管專家，撰寫有關(guān)貨幣、支付和數(shù)字資產(chǎn)的文章。

她的擔(dān)憂是否合理？僅適用于那些反對競爭且不喜歡監(jiān)管透明度的人。艾倫所描述的一種可怕且無用的時(shí)尚是過去 25 年來最具革命性的金融創(chuàng)新之一的升級版：由非銀行機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)行的電子貨幣，或者簡稱為電子貨幣。

2000 年代初，歐盟認(rèn)為是時(shí)候讓更多人獲得更快、更便宜的數(shù)字支付了。考慮到這一點(diǎn)，歐盟立法者制定了電子貨幣監(jiān)管框架，并允許初創(chuàng)企業(yè)充分利用技術(shù)，即所謂的金融科技，以受監(jiān)管和安全的方式提供支付工具。

其背后的想法很簡單。由于銀行是提供多種服務(wù)的復(fù)雜機(jī)構(gòu)，面臨更高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和更嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管，因此開設(shè)銀行賬戶進(jìn)行數(shù)字支付通常很困難且成本高昂。解決方案是為非銀行機(jī)構(gòu)建立一個單獨(dú)的許可和監(jiān)管制度，專注于一項(xiàng)服務(wù)：將他們從客戶那里收到的現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)化為可通過預(yù)付卡或電子設(shè)備用于數(shù)字支付的電子貨幣。

實(shí)際上，電子貨幣發(fā)行機(jī)構(gòu)的運(yùn)作就像狹義的銀行一樣。法律要求他們保護(hù)或確保從客戶處收到的現(xiàn)金，以便電子貨幣余額始終可以轉(zhuǎn)換回現(xiàn)金而不會損失價(jià)值。由于它們是獲得許可和受監(jiān)管的實(shí)體，因此客戶知道，除了嚴(yán)重的監(jiān)管失敗之外，他們的電子貨幣是安全的。

因此，很容易看出，絕大多數(shù)現(xiàn)有的穩(wěn)定幣，即以美元等主權(quán)貨幣計(jì)價(jià)的穩(wěn)定幣，只是具有一定功能的電子貨幣：由于它們是在區(qū)塊鏈上發(fā)行的，因此它們不受國家支付系統(tǒng)的限制，并且可以全球流通。

Instead of a scary financial product, stablecoins are really “e-money 2.0,” with the potential to keep delivering on the original e-money promises of increasing competition in the financial sector, lowering costs for consumers, and advancing financial inclusion.

But for these promises to be fulfilled, stablecoins do need to be properly regulated at the federal level. Without federal law, stablecoin issuers in the U.S. will continue to be subject to state money transmitter laws that aren’t uniformly designed or consistently enforced when it comes to segregation of clients’ funds and integrity of assets kept in reserve.

Considering the decades-long experience of the European Union in e-money and improvements brought by other countries, an effective stablecoin regulation should be built around three pillars: granting of a non-bank license, direct access to central-bank accounts, and bankruptcy protection for backing assets.

First, it’d be contradictory to restrict stablecoin issuance to banks. The essence of banking is the possibility of holding deposits from the public that aren’t always 100% backed, which is traditionally known as “fractional reserve banking.” And that happens so that banks can make loans without using only their capital.

For stablecoin issuers, on the other hand, the goal is that each stablecoin is fully backed with liquid assets. Their sole job is to receive cash, offer a stablecoin in return, hold safely the cash received, and return the cash anytime someone comes with a stablecoin to redeem. Lending money isn’t a part of their business.

Stablecoin issuers, much like e-money issuers, are meant to compete with banks in the payments sector, especially in cross-border payments. They’re not supposed to replace banks or, worse, become banks.

That’s why stablecoin issuers should be granted a specific non-bank license, as happens for e-money issuers in the E.U., U.K., and Brazil: a simpler license with requirements, including capital requirements, that are proportionate to their limited activity and lower risk profile. They don’t need a banking license, nor should they be required to get one.

Second, and to reinforce their lower risk profile, stablecoin issuers should be able to have a central-bank account to hold their backing assets. Transferring the cash received from their customers to a bank account or investing it in short-term securities are typically safe options, but both can become riskier in times of stress.

Circle, a U.S. stablecoin issuer, had a hard time when Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed, and $3.3 billion of its cash reserves (almost 10% of the total reserves) that had been deposited with SVB were temporarily unavailable. And several banks, including SVB, that were holding U.S. treasuries suffered losses after interest rates rose in 2022, and the treasuries’ market price declined, leaving some of them short on liquidity and unable to face withdrawals.

Read more: Dan Kuhn - What Visa’s ‘Organic’ Stablecoin Report Misses

為了避免銀行系統(tǒng)或國債市場的問題蔓延到穩(wěn)定幣，應(yīng)要求發(fā)行人將其支持準(zhǔn)備金直接存入美聯(lián)儲。這一規(guī)則將有效消除美國穩(wěn)定幣市場的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并實(shí)現(xiàn)對穩(wěn)定幣支持的實(shí)時(shí)監(jiān)管——不需要存款保險(xiǎn)，也沒有救助風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，就像電子貨幣一樣，與銀行存款相反。

請注意，非銀行機(jī)構(gòu)的中央銀行賬戶并非史無前例。英國、瑞士和巴西等國家的電子貨幣發(fā)行機(jī)構(gòu)可以直接通過央行保護(hù)用戶的資金。

第三，法律應(yīng)將客戶的資金與發(fā)行人的資金分開考慮，并且如果穩(wěn)定幣發(fā)行人失敗（例如，由于欺詐等運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的出現(xiàn)），客戶的資金應(yīng)不受任何破產(chǎn)制度的約束。

有了這一額外的保護(hù)層，穩(wěn)定幣用戶可以在清算過程中快速重新獲得資金，因?yàn)槠飘a(chǎn)發(fā)行人的一般債權(quán)人將無法扣押客戶的資金。同樣，這被認(rèn)為是電子貨幣發(fā)行者的最佳實(shí)踐。

在有關(guān)穩(wěn)定幣監(jiān)管的公開辯論中，令人震驚的做法可能會給心煩意亂的觀眾留下深刻印象。但是，對于那些關(guān)注的人來說，基于世界各地成功范例和經(jīng)驗(yàn)的平衡論點(diǎn)應(yīng)該占上風(fēng)。

熱點(diǎn)：監(jiān)管 穩(wěn)定幣 美國